further deterioration of administration positions re: reasons for invading Iraq, admissions of error re: post-Iraq handling:
http://slate.msn.com/id/2107847/#ContinueArticle
1) Rumsfeld acknowledges no significant Saddam-al Qaeda connection (backpedals later under administrative pressure)
2) Duelfer issues CIA report confirming Kaye's analysis Iraq had no significant WMD capabilities since '96 (Saddam was posturing to keep Iran guessing)
3) Bremer admitting we needed more troops to ensure security (aka Shinseki was right; Wolfowitz et al were wrong)
4) Americans not welcomed after war; initial disbanding of Iraqi military accelerated deterioration of security in Iraq, fueled insurgency ranks & arms
5) CSIS analysis concludes majority of Iraq reconstruction funds (73 cents of every dollar) being wasted on administrative costs & overhead; also on corruption, bribery & mismgmt
6) In addition to bureaucratic waste, and in addition to escalated re-direction of funding to security, majority of allocated funds for Iraq security remain unspent
finally, in review of American policy and execution in Iraq last night, Cheney's response:
"What we did in Iraq was exactly the right thing to do. If I had it to recommend all over again, I would recommend exactly the same course of action."